Foreign enclaves, informal sector and urban unemployment: A theoretical analysis by Bandopadhyay, Titas Kumar
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign enclaves, informal sector and
urban unemployment: A theoretical
analysis
Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay
Bagnan College
April 2002
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3136/
MPRA Paper No. 3136, posted 9. May 2007
1FOREIGN ENCLAVES, INFORMAL SECTOR AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT ---
--- A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.*
BY
TITAS KUMAR BANDOPADHYAY
BAGNAN COLLEGE, P.O. BAGNAN
DIST. HOWRAH, WESTBENGAL,
INDIA.
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2FOREIGN ENCLAVES, INFORMAL SECTOR AND URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT ---
--- A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS.
1. INTRODUCTION :
The recent literature on foreign enclave has enlightened the expansion of foreign
enclave and its effects on unemployment and national income. The issue on foreign enclave
includes the works of Young (1987, 1992), Young and Miyagiwa (1987), Miyagiwa(1993),
Dutta Chaudhury and Adhikari (1993) and Gupta (1994a). All the models are basically
Harris-Todaro (1970) type complementing a foreign enclave and in all the models foreign
enclave uses sector-specific capital.
In the Young-Miyagiwa (1987) model, foreign enclave is located in the rural sector
and capital is purely non-shiftable among all the sectors. They have shown that the expansion
of foreign enclave through the reduction in tariff on intermediate inputs lowers
unemployment.
Dutta Chaudhury and Adikari (1993) have considered capital mobility between the
rural sector and the urban sector and have introduced supply function of foreign capital in the
Young-Miyagiwa (1987) model. They have shown that tariff reduction on intermediate input
raises unemployment.
In Gupta (1994a), we find DFZ in the urban area and domestic capital is shiftable
between the rural sector and the urban non-DFZ. He has shown that the reduction in import
duty on intermediate goods, used in the foreign sector, raises unemployment, but we get
opposite result if tariff on final goods is reduced.
In this paper, we consider a small open Harris-Todaro economy with rural foreign
enclave and urban informal sector. None of the existing models on foreign enclaves considers
the co-existence of these two sectors. To explain the simultaneous existence of informal
sector and urban unemployment we introduce consumption-efficiency relation in the informal
sector.1 We assume that foreign enclave uses sector-specific foreign capital and the other
sectors use domestic capital.
We consider both the shiftable and non-shiftable capital and we examine the impact
of expansion of the foreign enclaves, thru the fiscal concessions, on urban unemployment and
domestic factor income.
The model is described in section2. In this section we assume the non-shiftability of
domestic capital among the rural sector, urban formal sector and urban informal sector2. The
basic model is extended in three ways. In section3., the basic model is extended by
3introducing capital mobility between the rural sector and the urban informal sector3, whereas
the foreign enclaves uses sector specific foreign capital and the urban formal sector uses
sector-specific domestic capital. Section4. extends the basic model by assuming capital
mobility between the rural sector and the urban formal sector4, while the foreign enclave uses
sector-specific foreign capital and the urban informal sector uses sector-specific domestic
capital. Another extension is made in section5.by assuming perfect intersectoral mobility of
domestic capital among the rural sector, the urban formal sector and the urban informal
sector5, whereas the foreign enclaves uses foreign capital. Conclusions are made in Section6.
2. THE MODEL :
2.1. ASSUMPTIOMS :
We consider a small open Harris-Todaro (1970) economy complementing the rural
foreign enclave and the urban informal sector. Here, the foreign enclave is a labor supplying
sector, since it is located in the rural areas6. All the sectors produce internationally traded
goods and the prices of these goods  are exogenously given7.
The production functions of all the sectors exhibit CRS and have positive and
diminishing marginal productivity to each input. Each sector uses only two inputs-labor and
capital. Capital is measured in physical unit, while labor is measured in efficiency unit8.
Workers’ efficiency is positively related to the wage rate they receive. Such efficiency
wage relation is more pronounced when the wage rate is low. It is assumed that the worker’s
efficiency is equal to one after a certain level of wage W* and is less than one below that
specified level of wage. The wage rates in the urban formal sector, rural sector and the
foreign enclave are higher than this specified level of wage, while the wage rate in the urban
informal sector is assumed to be less than this level. Thus, for the UFS, RS and the foreign
enclave, labor expressed in labor time is identical to that expressed in efficiency unit.
However, for the UIS efficiency units of lobor differ from the labor time units of labor.
All the markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive. The assumptions of CRS
production functions and profit maximizing behaviour of the firm imply the equality between
price and unit cost in  each sector and the minimisation of cost of one efficiency unit of labor.
Workers migrate from the rural sector to the urban region. Some of them are absorbed
either in the UFS or in the UIS and a portion of them remains unemployed in the urban
sector. The migration mechanism is of Harris-Todaro (1970) type.
4Urban formal wage rate is institutionally fixed and is higher than the wage rates in all
other sectors. The rural wage rate and the wage rate in the foreign enclave are equal since the
workers are perfectly mobile between the RS and the foreign enclave.
We assume that the foreign enclave uses sector specific foreign capital and its supply
is assumed to be exogenously given9. It is also assumed that the entire foreign capital income
is fully repatriated10. Domestic capital is also assumed to be non-shiftable. Thus, we have
different rate of returns on capital in different sectors. The endowment of labor and domestic
capital are also exogenously given.
It is assumed that the urban formal sector is more capital intensive than the rural
sector  which is more capital intensive than the urban informal sector.
2.2. NOTATIONS :
j = u, i, r, F.
u = Urban formal sector.
i = Urban informal sector
r = Rural sector.
F = Foreign enclave.
Xj = Level of output in the j th sector.
Lj= Level of employment in the j th sector
kj = Capital intensity of the j th sector.
Wj = wage rate in the j th sector.
h = Worker’s efficiency.
Rj = Rental rate on capital in the j th sector.
Vi = Cost of one efficiency unit of labor in the urban informal sector.
L = Labor endowment of the entire economy.
Kj = Stock of capital in the jth sector.
Pj = Producer’s effective price of the j th good.
fj = Intensive production function of the j th good.
Cj = Unit cost of production of the j th good.
U =  Level of urban unemployment.
Y = Domestic factor income  of the economy.
52.3 THE EQUATIONS :
The intensive production functions of the four sectors are given by :
Xu = Lufu (ku)…………………………………………(1) ;
Xi = Lifi (ki,h)………………………………………   (2) ;
Xr = Lrfr (kr) ………………………………………… (3) ;
XF = LFfF (kF)…………………………………………(4) ;
The efficiency-wage relation in the informal sector is given by :
h = h (Wi) ……………………………………………  (5) ;
Following restrictions are imposed on this efficiency function :
i) h′ (Wi) > 0 for Wi < W* ;  ii) h (Wi) = 1 for Wi ≥  W*  ;
ii) and  iii) h′′ (Wi) ≥  0 for Wi ≤   W* *  <  W*  .
The cost of one efficiency ;unit of labor in the UIS is :
Vi = (Wi / h (Wi) ) ………………………………………………………  (6) ;
The minimisation of efficiency unit cost of labor implies  :
(h′ (Wi), Wi / h (Wi) )   = 1 ……………………………………….(7) .
The long run equilibrium of a competitive firm implies that price is equal to the unit cost in
each sector. Hence, we have the following equations :
Pu = Cu (Wu , Ru ) ………………………………………(8) ;
Pi = Ci  (Vi , Ri ) ………………………………………   (9) ;
Pr = Cr (Wr , Rr) …………………………………………(10) ; and
PF = CF (Wr , RF) ………………………………………..(11)
The optimum capital – labor ratios are given by :
Ku = ku (Wu / Ru) ………………………………………..(12) ;
ki = ki (Vi / Ri) …………………………………………..(13) ;
kr = kr ( Wr / Rr) …………………………………………(14) ;
kF = kF (Wr / RF) ………………………………………...(15) ;
Wr = (Lu / (L – Lr – LF) ) Wu  + (Li / (L – Lr – Li ) ) Wi ………………..(16) ;
Is the Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition.
Full utilisation of capital and labor implies the following equations :
ku Lu = Ku …………………………………………………….(17) ;
ki Li = Ki ……………………………………………………...(18) ;
kr Lr = Kr ………………………………………………………(19) ;
kF LF = KF …………………………………………………….. (20) ; and
6u,i,r,F
∑    Lj + U = L ………………………………………………………(21)
 j
The domestic factor  income is given by :
Y = WuLu + WiLi + WrLr + WrLF + ∑ RjKj ………………(22)
   j
Using equations (16) , (21) and (22) we get,
Y = WrL + ∑ RjKj………………………………………………(22a)
This completes the equational structure of the model.
2.4. WORKING OF THE MODEL :
The working of the model is described as follows :
Equation (7) yields the equilibrium value of Wi. Then, we get the value of Vi from equation
(6) and of h from equation (5). Given, Pu and Wu , we get Ru from equation (8). Equation (9)
gives the equilibrium value of Ri , given Pi and Vi.
Now , ku and ki  are obtained from equations (12) and (13). So, we get Lu and Li from
equations (17) and (18), given Ku, Kr, ku and ki.
From equation (10) we find that Rr is a function of Wr. Equation (11) shows Wr as
function of RF. Thus, equations (14) and (15) show that both kr and kF are also functions of
RF. This implies  that  Lr and LF are also functions of RF (see equations (19) and (20)). Thus,
we can determine the equilibrium value of RF from equations (16), given Lu, Li, Wu and Wi.
Hence, we get the equilibrium values of Wr, Rr, kr, kF, Lr and LF.
Equilibrium value of unemployment is obtained from equation (21), given Lj
(  j = u,i,r,F).
Xj s are  obtained from equations (1) to (4). Finally, equation (22a) yields equilibrium
value of Y.
2.5. COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS :
2.5.1. CHANGE IN PF ; If foreign enclave is expanded through the subsidization to this
sector, PF will rise. Appendix (A.1) shows that when PF is raised, both Wr and RF rise. Now,
equation 10 implies that Rr falls, given Pr. Thus, kr rises but kF may move in any direction.
7Thus, Lr falls but LF may change in any direction. From equation 16 we get, (Wu – Wr) Lu –
(Wr – Wi) Li = WrU. This shows that U falls if PF rises, given Wu, Lu, Wi and Li.
Now, we examine the effect of a rise in PF on Y. As PF is raised, Wr rises and Rr falls,
RF fall. So we can write ,dY = LdWr + KrdRr; or dy = dRr (LdWr / dRr + Kr) = dRr (kr Lr –
Lkr) = krdRr (Lr – L) > 0 (since dRr <0). So Y will rise.
The above results lead to the following proposition :
PROPOSITION 1:  Expansion of foreign enclave thru the subsidization to this sector lowers
urban unemployment and raises domestic factor income.
In the Y-M model, expansion of foreign enclave lowers Unemployment and in Dutta
Chaudhuri it raises unemployment. However , in these two models foreign enclave expands
thru the reduction in import duty on intermediate input used in this sector.
2.5.2. CHANGE IN Kf :
If the stock of foreign cpaital is increased, Lr will rise, given kF. So, the effect of a
rise in KF on Wr, RF and Rr are similar to those obtained in section 2.5.1.
3. CAPITAL MOBILITY BETWEEN THE URBAN INFORMAL SECTOR AND THE
RURAL SECTOR ;
3.1. In this Section the basic model is extended by introducing capital mobility between
the rural sector and the urban informal sector. The other two sectors use sector-
specific capital.
3.2. EQUATIONS ;
Since the capital is mobile between the rural sector and the urban informal sector, we have a
common rate of return on capital in these two sectors. Thus, the price equations for the rural
sector become :
Pr = Cr (Wr , Ri) …………………………….(10a)
The two capital endowment equations will merge into one equation :
ki Li + Kr Lr = Ki ………………………………………(19a)
The optimum capital intensity for the rural sector becomes :
Kr = kr (Wr / Ri) ……………………………..(14a)
The domestic factor income is now given by
Y = WrL + RuKu + RiKi …………………….(22a’)
83.3. WORKING OF THE MODEL :
Like the model of Section 2. the optimum values of Wi , h, Vi, Ru, Ri, ku, ki, Lu, Xu and Xi are
obtained from equations (5) to (7) , (8) , (9), (12), (13), (14), (1) and (2).
Now, equation (10a) yields the equilibrium value of Wr, given P and Ri.
Then, we get RF from equation (11), given PF and Wr. The equilibrium values of factor prices
Wr, Ri & RF give the optimum capital intensity Kr and KF (see equations (14), (15) ). From
equation (20), we get LF, given kF + KF
The equilibrium level of employment of the urban informal sector and the rural sector
can be obtained from equations (16) and (19a). The determination of Li and Lr may be shown
in a simple diagramme (see fig. 1).
SPACE FOR FIGURE 1
The LL curve is obtained from equation (16). The solve of the LL curve is given by
(dLi / dLr) LL = - (Wr / Wi). Thus, the LL curve is negatively sloped and it shifts when L, LF,
Wu and Lu are changed . Equation 18a) gives the KK curve. The slope of the KK curve is
given by (dli(dlr)
 KK = - (kr /ki). So, this curve is also negatively sloped and it shifts when Ki
is changed. Here, the KK curve is steeper than the LL curve because the rural sector is more
capital intensive than the urban informal sector in value terms 11. The intersection of the two
curves determine (Lr, Li ).
Now, equilibrium level of unemployment is obtained from equation (21).
The level of output of the rural sector and the urban informal sector are obtained from
equations (2) and (3). Finally, equation (22a′) yields the domestic factor income.
3.4. COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS :
3.4.1. CHANGE IN PF :
Subsidization to output in the foreign enclave  raises PF. Then, equation (11) shows that RF
will rise, given Wr. Thus, (Wr/RF) falls and so also kF . Hence, LF rises, given KF (see
equation (20) ).
The increase in LF leads to a leftward shift of the LL curve. Thus, in new equilibrium,
Lr rises and Li falls, given the KK curve.  (See the appendix A.2)
From equation (16) we can write, (Wu – Wr)Lu – (Wr – Wi) Li = WrU.
This shows that U rises with PF, given Wu , Wr, Lu and Wi.
9It is assumed that the income from foreign capital is totally repatriated. As the rise in
PF has no effect on Wr, Ru and Ri, it has also no effect on Y. Thus, we can get the following
proposition :
PROPOSITION 3 : Expansion of the foreign enclave thru the output subsidy to that sector
raises urban unemployment. However, its effect on Y is nil.
3.4.2. CHANGE IN KF :
An increase in the stock of foreign capital raises KF. As factor prices Wr and RF do not
depend upon KF, the rise in KF raises LF. This rise in LF produces the results similar to those
obtained in the previous case. Thus, even if the foreign enclave is expanded thru the increase
in the stock of foreign capital, urban unemployment rises and domestic factor income does
not change.
4. CAPITAL MOBILITY BETWEEN THE UFS AND THE RS :
4.1. ASSUMPTIONS : In this Section we extend the model of Section2. by
introducing capital mobility between the UFS and the RS. The other two sectors are assumed
to use the sector-specific capital.
4.2. EQUATIONS :
Since the UFS and the RS use the same type of capital and there is no ditortion in this
capital market, we get a uniform rate of return on capital in these two sectors ., Ru.
Thus , the price equation for the rural sector (equation (10) becomes
Pr = Cr(Wr, Ru)……………………………………(10b).
The optimum rural capital intensity is given by
kr = kr (Wr / Ru) ………………………………….(14a)
The capital endowment equations (17) and (18) become
kuLu + krLr = Ku ……………………………………..(17a)
The domestic factor income is given by
Y = WrL + RuKu + RiKi ………………………….(22a′)
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4.3 WORKING OF THE MODEL :
The equilibrium value of Wi, Vi and h are obtained from equations (5) to (7). Equation (8)
gives RU and equation (9) gives Ri. Equilibrium  Wr is obtained from equation (10b), given Pr
& Ru. Then, we get RF from equation (11), given PF. Thus, we get optimum capital
intensities. So, we obtain Li , given Ki, KF & LF (see equations 19 & 20)).
Now, from equations (16) and (17a) we get the equilibrium values of Lu and Lr. This
may be shown graphically (see Fig. 2.) . The L′ L′ curve is obtained from equation (16) and
the K′ K′ curve is obtained from equation (17a). Both the curves are negatively sloped. The
K′ K′ steeper than the L′L′ curve since we assume that the urban sector is more capital
intensive than the rural sector in value terms. The intersection of the two curves determines
(Lu , LR) .
SPACE FOR FIG . 2.
Now, we can determine the equilibrium U from equation (21). Thus, the equilibrium levels of
output can be obtained from equations (1) to (4).
Finally, equation (22a) yields the equilibrium value of Y.
4.3. COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS :
4.4.1. CHANGE IN PF :
Output subsidy given to the foreign enclave raises PF. This also raise RF ; given Wr. So,
(Wr/RF) falls and so also kF. This implies that LF will rise, given KF. This will shift the LL
curve to the left. As a result, Lu rises and Lr falls. (See the appendix A.3) From equations (16)
and (21) we find if Lu rises, U also rises given Wu, Wi, Wr and Li.
So far as Y is concerned, we find the rise in PF has no effect on Y since Wr, Ru & Ri remain
frozen in this case.
Thus , we can make the following proposition :
PROPOSITION 4. If foreign enclave is expanded thru the output subsidy given to this
sector, urban unemployment rises, but domestic factor income does not change at all.
4.4.2. CHANGE IN KF :
If foreign capital is enlarged, LF rises, given kF. In this case, we get the similar results
as obtained when PF is raised. Thus, even if the foreign enclave is expanded thru the
11
increase in the stock of foreign capital, urban unemployment rises, but domestic factor
income remains unchanged.
5. CAPITAL MOBILITY AMONG THE UFS, UIS, AND THE RS :
5.1 ASUMPTIONS :
In this section, we assume perfect capital mobility among the UFS, UIS and Rs, while
foreign enclave uses sector-specific foreign capital. Thus, we have a common rate of
return on domestic capital.
We assume that the goods produced in the UIS is non-traded. UFS is more capital
intensive than the RS which is more capital intensive than the UIS in value terms.
5.2. EQUATIONS :
Since the domestic capital is mobile among the UFS, UIS and RS the three price
equations become :
Pu = Cu (Wu, R) ………………………………………………   (8a);
Pi = Ci (Vi, R) ………………………………………………….. (9a) ; and
Pr = Cr (Wr, R) ………………………………………………… (10c).
The optimum capital intensities for the three domestic capital using sectors become :
ku = ku (Wu/R) …………………………………………. (12′) ;
ki = ki (Wi/R) ………………………………………….. (13′); and
kr = kr (Wr/R) ………………………………………… (14′).
The three capital endowment equations (17), (18) and (19) become :
KuLu + kiLi + krLr = KD ……………………………….. (17′).
The demand for the goods produced in the UIS is given by :
Di = Di (Pi) ,  Di′< O
Thus, the market equilibrium for the UIS’s  product is given by :
Xi = Di (Pi) ………………………………………………. (23)
The domestic factor income will be :
Y = WrL + RKD …………………………………………. (22′)
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5.3. WORKING OF THE MODEL :
The equilibrium values of Wi, Vi and h are obtained from equations (5), (6), (7). All
the factor prices R, Wr & RF can be determined from equations (8′) and (10′) an (11),
given Wu. Thus, we get optimum capital intensities ku, ki, kr and kF from equations
(12′) to (14′) and (15) . Now, equation (11) yields equilibrium Pi, given Vi and R. We
get equilibrium Li from equation (20) and LF from equation (23).
Now, equilibrium Lu and Lr can be determined from equations (16) an (17′). This is
shown in figure –3. The MM curve is obtained from equation (16). Its slope is given
by (dLr/ dLu) MM = - (Wu/Wr). Thus, the MM curve is negatively sloped and it shifts
when Wu, Wr, L, LF, Wi & Li are changed. Equation (17′) gives the NN curve, whose
slope is given by (dLr/ dLu) NN = - (ku/kr). This is also negatively sloped and shifts
when KD, Ki, L, Li are changed. The NN curve is steeper than the MM curve as we
assume that the UFS is more capital intensive than the RS in value terms12. The
intersection of the two curves determines equilibrium (Lu*, Lr* ).
Now, the equilibrium level of urban unemployment is obtained from equation (21).
The level of output Xu, Xr, XF are obtained from equations (1) to (3) and (4). Finally,
Y is determined from equation (22′).
5.4. COMPARATIVE STATIC EFFECTS ;
5.4.1. CHANGE IN PF :
Output subsidization to the foreign enclave raises PF. As a result, RF rises, given Wr
(See equation (11). Thus, (Wr/RF) falls and so also kF. Equation (20) shows that LF
rises, given KF. Thus, the MM curve shifts downward. This leads to a rise in Lu and
fall in Lr. (See the appendix A.3) Now, equation (16) implies that U must rise when
Lu rises, given Wu, Wi, Li & Wr.
Equation (22′) shows that there is no effect on Y since rise in PF does not affect Wr
and R.
The above result leads to the following proposition :
PROPOSITION 5 : Expansion of the foreign enclave thru output subsidy leads to a
rise in urban unemployment. However, its effects on domestic factor income is nil.
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5.4.2. CHANGE IN KF
If foreign capital stock is increased, KF will rise. This raises LF, given kF. Thus, we
get the same effect on unemployment and on Y, as obtained in proposition 5.
6. CONCLUSION.
This paper presents a model with special emphasis on foreign enclove, informal sector
and urban unemployment. The simultaneous existence of the urban informal sector
and urban unemployment is explained interms of the efficiency wage theory. Like,
Young-Miyagiwa (1987), we assume a rural foreign enclave, implying this as a labour
supplying sector. This paper examines the impact of expansion of foreign enclave on
urban unemployment and domestic factor income.  Our model differs form the
existing models on foreign enclave in two respects : here, foreign enclave expands
either thru the output subsidy given to this sector or thru the enlargement of foreign
capital ; and different types of capital mobility among the sectors are assumed in this
paper.
The comparative static analysis shows that if foreign enclave expands either thru the
price subsidy or thru the increase in the stock of foreign capital, urban unemployment
falls when capital is purely non-shiftable and it rises it capital is shiftable perfectly or
imperfectly. This is opposite to that of YM (1987). We get the same result in Dutta
Chowdhury (1993) and Gupta (1994). However, our model differs from them with
respect to the mode of expansion of foreign enclave and nature of capital mobility.
The paper also shows that domestic factor income does not change even if foreign
enclave expands when capital is perfectly or imperfectly mobile. Only when capital is
purely non-shiftable, such expansion has expansionary effect on domestic factor
income.
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Foot Notes :
This is related to the research work of the Author who is registered for Ph.D. Degree
in the University of Calcutta.
1. Fields (1987) explains urban unemployment in a framework where
unemployed are more efficient in job search than those employed in the urban
informal sector. Gupta (1993) explains this in a frame work where price is
fixed and quantity adjusts to clear the market for RS’s product.
2. Young-Miyagiwa (1987) also consider the non-shiftable capital among the
UFS, Rs and Foreign enclave.
3. Gupta (1997) considers this type of capital mobility.
4. Grinols (1991) considers this type of capital mobility.
5. Chandra & Khan (1993) have considered this type of capital mobility.
6. Both Y-M (1987) an Tamal Dutta Chowdhury(1989) consider rural Foreign
enclave, whereas Gupta (1994) considers urban Foreign enclave.
7. Chandra & Khan (1993), Grinols (1991) and Gupta (1997) have made this
type of assmption.
8. The efficiency-wage theory implies that physical unit of labour differs from
efficiency unit of labour.
9. Dutta Chowdhury and Adhikari (1989) have introduced the supply function of
foreign capital.
10. If entire foreign capital income is repatriated, domestic factor income does not
include the rental income on foreign capital.
11. This implies that Wikr>Wrki.
12.  This implies that Wrku> Wukr.
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